Religious Practice and Political Attitudes among Shiʻites in Iran and Iraq 🔓

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Abstract and Keywords

How does religiosity shape beliefs about the proper role of religion in politics? We consider this question using an original survey of religious Shiʻites in Iran and Iraq, taken during the world's largest annual pilgrimage. We find that among both Iranians and Iraqis, communally oriented practice is highly associated with a desire for leadership by religious figures and adherence to religious principles in politics. We argue that this influence operates through religious socialization, or the transmission of norms through organizational or social aspects of religion. In Iran, we also find that individual practice is highly associated with greater support for the regime. We argue this demonstrates successful religious legitimation, in which the Iranian regime is seen as a legitimate theocracy among respondents. These findings highlight both the important role that religious practice can play in influencing attitudes and provide surprising evidence about the ideological underpinnings of regime persistence in Iran.

Keywords: religion, Islam, Shiʻa, Iraq, Iran, pilgrimage, theocracy, socialization, practice, survey

Across Muslim societies, the past decades have seen a resurgence in support for religion in politics (Grzymala-Busse 2012). Much work has shown that this support is often driven by the social or welfare services that religious political movements provide (Lia 1998; Amuzegar 2007; Mujani and Liddle 2009; Pepinsky et. al 2012; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014, among others). However, much less is known about whether and how religious practice itself—either communal or individual—shapes support for religion in politics.

We examine this question among religious Shiʻa in both Iran and Iraq, two countries that differ significantly in the place of religion within their political system. In both contexts, the religious individuals surveyed represent important social groups that provide a base of support in Iran and hold significant sway within Iraq (K. Harris 2017; Mikulaschek, Pant, and Tesfaye 2020). The data for this study is based on a geographically representative original survey of Shiʻa pilgrims traveling to Karbala, Iraq, during Arbaʻeen in 2015. This event, the world's largest annual pilgrimage, draws a demographically diverse group of religious Shiʻa from across the Muslim world, providing a unique opportunity to survey

an important but understudied group. While Shiʻa make up roughly 20 percent of the world's Muslims,[1] surveys of the Middle East and North Africa have been unable to properly cover Iran due to regime restrictions and have had more limited access in Iraq because of the post-2003 conflict. The survey covered a wide range of topics; more details are provided in a separate descriptive report of the survey (Christia, Dekeyser, and Knox 2019).

The impact of religion is often considered in terms of three constituent parts—identity, belief, and practice. In this work, we focus on how the latter dimension relates to attitudes about religion in politics in the Iranian and Iraqi contexts, given that Muslim religious identity remains largely fixed in the two populations, and the intensity of belief is difficult to both quantify and measure. Religious practice, however, can be further subdivided into two dimensions, *individual* and *communal* practice. These two dimensions would be expected to have different relationships to attitudes about religion in politics. Individual practice might influence attitudes about religion in politics if there exists *religious legitimacy*, or the existence of doctrinal or ideological support for the concept. Communal practice, on the other hand, could also shape beliefs through *religious socialization*, or the non-ideological transmission of norms through the organizational or social aspects of religious practice (Christia, Dekeyser, and Knox 2019). The concept of religious socialization builds upon a rich literature, both from the American (F. Harris 1994; M. Harris 1998; Putnam 2000; Wald, Silverman, and Fridy 2005) and Middle Eastern (Jamal 2005; Loveland et al. 2005) contexts about the link between religious practice and political outcomes. Work on religious legitimation, however, has remained much more limited. These two mechanisms can occur simultaneously and potentially work in opposite directions; similarly, religious mechanisms operate simultaneously with other nonreligious sources of support for religious involvement in politics.

In addition to (1) an abstract belief about the proper role of religious principles and leaders in governance, we also examine a number of additional outcome variables that capture the very different implications of this belief in the Iranian and the Iraqi contexts. In Iran, the regime claims to be a theocracy—the ultimate embodiment of religion in politics —meaning that support for religious involvement in politics relates directly to (2) perceptions of regime legitimacy and (3) lower support for democracy, often viewed as contrasting with the current regime. Our results have important implications for understanding regime support and regime longevity in Iran. Even work that addresses the non-ideological sources of support for the regime highlights how "Shiʻa political Islam … at least creates tacit acceptance of the state as legitimately acting in the population's interests" (K. Harris 2017, 26). This work also posits that this link is particularly strong among certain social groups, including the religious Iranians that we survey, who have been central to the regime's longevity. Yet whether there is in fact a link between religiosity and state support has remained unclear; here, we show that not only do individuals who engage in individual religious practice support the regime more, but that communal practice reinforces beliefs about religion in politics that further reinforces this tendency.

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In Iraq, however, the link between the state and religion remains much more tenuous. Successive governments have attempted to use religious rhetoric to legitimate themselves, with limited success. Crucially, however, Iraq claims only to be an "Islamic, democratic, federal parliamentary republic," not a theocracy. Therefore, in addition to abstract beliefs about religion in politics, we examine (3) respondents' support for democracy and (4) sectarian political outlook. Understanding how religious individuals perceive Iraq's current government, as well as the broader democratic system, provides insight into the motivations for shifting bases of support in Iraq.

To measure these concepts, we use an innovative Bayesian principal component framework to aggregate batteries of questions relating to each topic. The resulting measures are used in Bayesian linear regressions in a way that captures the uncertainty from dimension reduction, missingness, and the regression itself. Overall, we find that both individual and communal religious practice are associated with greater support for religion in politics, but these aspects of religion play markedly different roles in each country. In Iraq, communal religious practice is strongly linked to abstract beliefs about religion's role in politics, and it shapes opposition to democracy as a system of government both directly and through the channel of these abstract beliefs. In Iran, communal practice is similarly linked to views on religion in politics, though to a lesser extent, and its influence on regime support is most evident through this channel. Taken together, these results on the influence of communal religious practice provide support for the socializing and organizing power of religion to garner support for the state, concurring with other work on the relationship between religious practice and political outcomes.

Yet the role of religious practice is more complex than mere socialization. In Iran, we find that individual religious practice matters much more, both for abstract beliefs and perceptions of the regime—evidence, we argue, that Iran has succeeded in religiously legitimating itself among this sector of society and in creating an ideological link between religious devotion and the regime in this national context. In contrast, the relationship between individual practice and views on religion in politics is three times weaker in Iraq, and we find no overall connection between individual practice and either support for democracy or sectarian political outlooks. These differences highlight how religious legitimation has encouraged regime longevity in Iran, while its absence allows for the continued instability of the Iraqi state.

This work presents four important findings. First, by exploring the beliefs of Shi'ites, rather than Sunnis, it helps move research on religion and politics in the Middle East beyond majority narratives, dominated largely by Sunni populations, and explore how these relationships vary within Shi'ite populations. The findings, however, do provide insight into the potential broader variation across the Middle East in the relationship between religious practice and political beliefs. Second, different types of religious practice not only have different effects on political attitudes depending on context, but they can also reinforce one another. Third, these effects are highly context-dependent, particularly on the relationship between the regime and Islam. Fourth, the fact that communal practice has an effect on political attitudes among Iraqi Shi'ites but individual practice does not high-

lights how the various dimensions of religiosity can influence attitudes in different and surprising ways.

Below, we briefly discuss our data collection and the measurement of individual and communal practice, as well as outcomes. We then turn to detailed analyses, examining each outcome in turn and, for concrete questions like regime legitimacy, estimate the extent to which religion works indirectly through the channel of abstract political views as opposed to directly shaping beliefs.

The Survey

The primary data source used in this paper is based on an original survey conducted during the Arbaʾeen pilgrimage to Karbala in Iraq. This event, the world's largest annual pilgrimage, attracted a reported 22 million Shiʿa pilgrims during that year, with Iranians and Iraqis representing the largest groups. Arbaʾeen is a collective mourning ritual involving a pilgrimage on foot to the shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala. Walking is what distinguishes this particular visit, with pilgrims setting out days or weeks ahead of time, depending on their distance from Karbala, in order to walk to Imam Hussein's shrine for the celebrations. The walk involves groups walking from places as far as Basra (roughly 500 km away) and Baghdad (roughly 120 km away). In the more heavily frequented portions of the route, roadsides are dotted with clusters of service tents, known as *mawakib*, which offer food and shelter to pilgrims. Travelers stop for long periods of time, not only to dine or drink water and tea, but also to recharge cell phones, repair shoes, or even get weary feet and legs massaged by local volunteers. *Mawakib* tend to have a specific regional identity, hosting people from different governorates and provinces in Iraq and Iran, with separate tents for men and women. Because of their regional nature, these tents allowed us to target survey respondents by their region of origin.

We surveyed respondents from November 17 to December 12, 2015, a twenty-five-day window broadly associated with the 2015 Arbaʾeen celebrations. Our goal was not to survey a representative sample of pilgrims, but rather to develop a geographically representative sample that would allow us to understand how pilgrims from across Iraq and Iran perceive a wide variety of issues, and how this differed across the two country contexts. To define geographic targets for Shiʿa in Iran, we utilized the 2011 population census, which provides an accurate proxy given that the country is approximately 98 percent Shiʿa. Iraq, however, provides a greater challenge. Not only was its last census in 1997, after which there was significant population displacement, but information on sect has also remained largely restricted. In the absence of this data, we attempted to sample pilgrims according to the distribution of Shiʿa politicians in the Iraqi parliament, known as the Council of Representatives (COR).[2] We identified the sect of the parliamentarians holding these seats, and used the Shiʿa seats as a metric for the Shiʿa proportion of the population in that area. The nature of the event also allowed us to survey roughly equal numbers of male and female respondents, a rare opportunity in a region where women traditionally are excluded from the public sphere. For both genders, respondents were

chosen among pilgrims between eighteen and sixty years old, with roughly half below the age of thirty-five. In total, we surveyed 2,410 Iraqis and 1,668 Iranians.

This geographically representative sample of religious individuals from the two countries provides a central insight into a vital but vastly understudied population. In Iran, recent work has highlighted the importance of this particular social group to the endurance of the revolutionary system (K. Harris 2017). In Iraq, religious Shi'ites have provided an important constituency in the ebbs and flows of political power in the post-invasion period (Mikulaschek, Pant, and Tesfaye 2020).

The Sample

The Iranians and Iraqis surveyed represented a demographically, socioeconomically, and ideologically diverse sample. Comparison to the full national population is challenging in both contexts, particularly for Iraq, given the limited availability of representative data. Triangulating with alternate data sources, however, allows us to situate our sample within in the range of other surveys conducted in these contexts.

The Iranians surveyed followed the census age distribution closely; were slightly wealthier and more likely to own a car; and were more likely to have a high school education, but less likely to have a college education. Despite these averages, however, the survey includes a wide range of individuals from across the educational and economic spectrum that mirrors the diversity in Iran more broadly.

While data limitations in Iraq do not allow a comparison to the census, we compared the population to two large-scale and geographically diverse surveys in the country, the Arab Barometer and the World Bank's Living Standards surveys. A weakness of both, however, is that they do not distinguish Sunni respondents from the Shi'a group that we examine here. Our population is poorer and less educated than the Arab Barometer sample, and wealthier and more educated than the World Bank sample, indicating that our sample lies within the general range of well-designed survey pools. More comparisons and general descriptives can be found in the survey report (Christia, Dekeyser, and Knox 2016), *To Karbala: Surveying Religious Shi'a from Iran and Iraq*.

Table 1: Variables in Individual Practice Principal Component			
Question	**Responses**	**Iraq Proportion**	**Iran Proportion**
Do you pray	Yes	0.02	0.04
every day?	No	0.98	0.96
How often do you ...	At least once a day	0.45	0.47
Watch or listen to	At least once a week	0.34	0.29
religious	A few times a month	0.06	0.05
programs/sermons	At most once a month	0.1	0.1
	Never	0.05	0.08
How often do you ...	At least once a day	0.64	0.63
Read or listen to	At least once a week	0.23	0.21
the Qurʾan or Duʾa	A few times a month	0.03	0.04
	At most once a month	0.07	0.07
	Never	0.04	0.04

Table 2: Variables in Communal Practice Principal Component			
Question	**Responses**	**Iraq Proportion**	**Iran Proportion**
How often do you ...	At least once a day	0.06	0.25
Attend Friday	At least once a week	0.18	0.16
prayers/women's prayer	A few times a month	0.13	0.11
	At most once a month	0.12	0.28
	Never	0.5	0.2
How often do you ...	At least once a day	0.09	0.47
Attend religious	At least once a week	0.12	0.29
lessons in the	A few times a month	0.12	0.05
Mosque	At most once a month	0.09	0.1
	Never	0.57	0.08
How often do you ...	At least once a day	0.17	0.63
Visit a mosque	At least once a week	0.25	0.21
	A few times a month	0.17	0.04

	At most once a month	0.15	0.07
	Never	0.26	0.04

Analysis

We use a range of detailed survey questions to measure both religious practice and political outcomes.

Measuring Practice

We measure individual and communal practice using a cluster of questions about religiosity from the survey. To measure communal practice, we examine the frequencies with which respondents reported attending Friday prayer, religious lessons, and mosque.[3] To measure individual practice, we use private religious behaviors. Specifically, we examine whether individuals pray daily, watch or listen to religious programs, and read the Qurʾan or Duʾa.[4] These questions can be seen in detail in Tables 1 and 2.

We then aggregated each cluster of questions using Bayesian principal component analysis (BPCA), which measures latent constructs by aggregating groups of related survey questions into overall indices with data-driven weights. (Unlike traditional principal components analysis, BPCA simultaneously addresses missingness on the component questions, allowing us to derive more robust results than standard principal component approaches that drop individuals who do not respond on any component question.) We find that our measure of communal practice weights each of its constituent religious practices virtually identically. In contrast, the first principal component of individual practice assigns indistinguishable weights to religious programs and reading of Qurʾan/Duʾa, but downweights prayer by roughly 25 percent.[5]

Measuring Outcomes

We identified one abstract outcome of interest—views about the role of religion in politics—and three concrete political attitudes—perceptions of democracy, regime legitimacy (in Iran only), and sectarian politics (Iraq only). Due to differing political systems, interpretations of these outcomes vary across national contexts, even though questions are worded identically. In Iran, the perceived legitimacy of a regime that claims to be theocratic is closely related to an individual's beliefs about religion in politics, while support for democracy in Iraq more loosely tied—while many Iraqi Shiʿites are dissatisfied with their government because they would prefer a more directly religious governing system, other sources of discontent also exist. We combined groups of questions relating to each of

these latent concepts using BPCA, focusing on the first principal component. (Details about constituent questions are reported in the Appendix.)

*Figure 1:* The relationship between religious practice and political outcomes.

Note: Each panel reports the relationship between religious practice and a political attitude. Points (error bars) correspond to posterior means (95 percent intervals) of Bayesian regressions incorporating uncertainty from BPCA measurement. All models include adjustment for years of education, income sufficiency, paid work, age, gender, news interest, conservatism as proxied by gender attitudes, civil society involvement, and province fixed effects.

Analysis and Findings

We begin by noting basic demographic differences that should be kept in mind when interpreting results, though we include controls for these characteristics in all analyses. Communal practicing Iraqis are more likely to be poor, unemployed, over fifty, and male than nonreligious Iraqis. Those who have higher levels of individual practice are more likely to be educated, less likely to be wealthy, more likely to be over thirty, and less likely to be male than their less pious compatriots. Communal practicing Iranians are more likely than nonreligious Iranians to have a primary or middle school education, be over fifty, and less likely to be male. Iranians who engage in more individual practice are less likely to be employed and more likely to be over thirty.

For each outcome of interest, we then run a linear regression, controlling for years of education,[6] income sufficiency,[7] paid work,[8] age,[9] gender, news interest,[10] conservatism as proxied by gender attitudes,[11] civil society involvement,[12], and province fixed effects. In addition to these controls, we also include our variables of interest, individual and communal practice; uncertainty in the measurement of these BPCA-based explanatory variables and outcomes are incorporated by repeatedly sampling, then combined with the uncertainty of the regression.

Results can be seen in Figure 1.

In Iraq, we find that communal practicing individuals are dramatically more likely to support a strong role for religion in politics ($p < 0.001$). In practical terms, these individuals are more opposed to democracy as a system of government ($p < 0.001$), and they are

more likely to hold sectarian political outlooks ($p = 0.038$)—for example, believing that out-group politicians cannot represent their interests. In supplemental mediation analyses, we find that a significant portion of communal practice's overall contribution to these practical political views flows through the channel of abstract religion-in-politics attitudes ($p < 0.001$ for both outcomes), but we also find evidence of a strong direct relationship between communal practice and anti-democracy positions ($p = 0.008$). These results are consistent with the transmission of nonreligious norms through religious practice. While more individual practicing individuals are also more supportive of religious involvement in politics, this attitude is more weakly linked than communal practice, and we find null—perhaps even negative—associations between individual practice and our practical political outcomes. Unsurprisingly, we find that neither form of religious practice is significantly associated with the legitimacy of the nonreligious government.

In Iran, we find that the relationship between communal practice and an individual's support for religion in politics is much weaker. In the Iranian context, individual practice is far more important. By the same token, more individual practicing individuals are much more likely to view the regime as legitimate, and also to oppose democratic systems of governance; a significant portion of individual practice's contribution to these practical attitudes appears to be mediated through abstract views about the proper role of religious principles and leaders. Given Iran's self-positioning as a theocracy, these correlations highlight how Iran has succeeded in gaining *religious legitimacy* among the highly devout. Communal practice has no discernible connection to regime support in our sample, though other work on religious legitimation has highlighted its importance as a conduit for information sharing, organization, and social pressure that can lead to greater support for a political regime (Ludden 2005, Wilkenson 2005, Mitchell 2017). (Indeed, we find participation in these group religious activities still seems to transmit other views, like anti-democratic beliefs, which are less directly tied to the regime.) While we do not dispute the importance of these channels, our findings highlight how religious ideology is a perhaps even more potent source of support both for religion in politics and for its manifestation in the current regime.

Alternate Explanations

We identify four alternate explanations for correlations between religiosity and political views: sociability, conservatism, economic interests, and intergroup contact. We do not argue that these potential confounders and sources of heterogeneity are unimportant; rather, our results suggest that, even holding these other factors constant, individual and communal practice can shape political attitudes across both country contexts.

One key concern is that the apparent importance of communal practice is an artifact of confounding—that "sociable" individuals are both more likely to be involved in communal activities in general, and also that this type of person has particular political attitudes. We alleviate this concern by controlling for participation in a variety of other types of civil so-

ciety organizations in all reported models; this does not change the relationship between communal practice and any of our outcomes of interest.

A second concern is that conservativism drives both individual practice and support for religion in politics. To test for this, we include a control for gender conservativeness—based on questions about gender roles and gender stereotypes—a proxy for overall socially conservative beliefs. Again, we include this variable in all reported specifications, and results are unchanged by its inclusion.

Third, it is possible that economic hardship is correlated with individual practice, thus confounding our results. The ability of the Iranian regime (and Islamist parties more generally) to provide economic benefits is a well-documented source of support for both (Mujani and Liddle 2009; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014, among others). Yet holding this constant, does ideology still play a role? We control for a range of economic variables in our results, roughly capturing demand for welfare. Yet again, our results hold, minimizing concerns about this possible link.

Finally, it is possible that the Iran-Iraq difference is due to the sectarian heterogeneity in Iraq, which leads to different expectations about what religious involvement in politics might look like and whose interests it might serve. In particular, Iraqi respondents might be concerned that democracy advances *Sunni* interests in Iraq, rather than secular interests, and this crucial difference might account for the difference in patterns from Iran. Yet even Shiʻa-dominated provinces, which mirror the sectarian homogeneity of Iran, show similar correlations to the rest of Iraq, indicating that sectarian homogeneity alone is not the primary determinant of this relationship.

Taken together, these findings provide additional support to the potential for ideology to influence religious legitimacy, and thus the relationship between religiosity and beliefs about religion in politics.

Discussion and Conclusion

This research provides a uniquely rich glimpse into the relationship between religiosity and religion in politics among devout Shiʻites in Iran and Iraq. Using an original survey of Shiʻite pilgrims during the Arba'een pilgrimage, we find that communal practice, in both contexts, plays an important role in reinforcing desire for religious principles and religious leaders in governance. Moreover, this desire manifests in specific and consequential political attitudes, particularly opposition to or support for the government. We argue that this process occurs largely through religious socialization, or the transmission of potentially nonreligious norms through religious practice. However, individual religious practice also plays a role in shaping beliefs about politics. Here, we find that it operates more strongly in Iran, where we argue that the regime's success in *religious legitimation* has led religious individuals to link regime support to religious devotion.

These findings concur with work that argues communal practice can play an important role in influencing political outcomes as a result of its organizing potential, information-spreading ability, and capacity to socially sanction its congregants (Ludden 2005; Wilkenson 2005; Mitchell 2017). This is what we find in the dynamic Iraqi environment—more communal religious practice is associated with greater support for Islamic systems of governance, but not with support for the (insufficiently religious) regime. Similarly, in Iran, more communal practice is associated with greater support.

Yet in Iran, however, we also see the result of nearly forty years of theocracy, where even individual practice is associated with greater support for Islamic systems of governance, and specifically the Iranian regime, highlighting how Iran has successfully legitimated its theocracy among devout individuals. We thus find that communal and individual practice function differently in Iran and Iraq, driven by how their governments relate to religion. This provides unique insight into the relationship between individual religiosity and the state in authoritarian and unstable democratic contexts.

We examine factors that could potentially confound the relationship between individual and communal practice and support for religion in politics. Our results hold even outside of self-selection into communal practice, conservatism, economic interests, and sectarian heterogeneity. While we do not argue that these cannot be drivers of support for religion in politics, both hypothetical and applied, we demonstrate that even outside their influence, piety and practice can play an important role.

More work must be done to better understand the avenues through which religious legitimation occurs, as in the Iranian context. This religious legitimation could occur through a variety of channels, whether religious leaders, political elites, historical factors, or constitutional factors. For instance, religious leaders could speak about the regime, thus validating it in the eyes of their members. Alternately, political and government elites could use religious rhetoric, which serves to religiously validate their position outside the influence of religious leaders. History could also play a role, with the revolution providing a symbolic background for the integration of religious and political life. Finally, constitutional factors—the fact that Iran is a self-identified theocracy—could also play a role in convincing its citizens of its religious legitimacy.

Our work has certain limitations. First, the nature of the data gathered makes causal analysis difficult. While we cannot randomly assign individual or communal practice, one can imagine a design that looks at how the ease of access to communal places of worship, for instance, influences religious outcomes, to disaggregate whether the relationship between religious practice and political beliefs is being driven by individuals who have the *desire* to practice more in community, or if it is the practice itself. Second, and relatedly, our work cannot distinguish the direction of the influence. In all likelihood, religious practice influences political beliefs, yet political beliefs also influence religious practice. Additional work should disaggregate the relative strength of these different causal directions.

Taken together, these findings provide vital insight into how religion can strengthen or weaken the state, either through religious legitimation or socialization, with important implications for the relationship between religion and the state in Muslim societies.

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Notes:

(1.) For more, see "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population," Pew Research Center, October 2009.

(2.) The COR has a total of 328 seats across Iraq's eighteen governorates. The allocation of seats is based on each governorate's estimated population size.

(3.) For religious lessons and mosque, respondents were given the choice of "at least once a day," "at least once a week," "a few times a month," "at most once a month," and "never." For attending Friday prayer, respondents were divided into those who responded "at least once a week," "a few times a month," "at most once a month," and "never."

(4.) Respondents were given the choice of "Yes" and "No" to the daily prayer, and the choice of "at least once a day," "at least once a week," "a few times a month," "at most once a month," and "never" for religious programs and reading the Qurʾan or Duʾa.

(5.) The difference in weighting reflects the fact that self-reported prayer frequency may be driven by other unobserved factors (such as social desirability) that are captured by the additional, discarded principal components.

(6.) Education is treated as a categorical variable with five levels: none, primary, middle school, high school, and college and above.

(7.) Income sufficiency is a categorical variable indicating whether or not individuals felt that their income was sufficient to meet their daily needs. Using this, rather than an absolute measure of income, allows us to account for differences in purchasing power parity across the two countries. Possible responses were as follows: "Our household income did not cover our expenses and we faced significant difficulties meeting our needs," "Our household income did not cover our expenses and we faced some difficulties meeting our needs," "Our household income covered our expenses without notable difficulties," and "Our household income covered our expenses well and we were able to save."

(8.) "Paid work" refers to whether a respondent is currently employed. This is an important control variable, as individuals who do not have a job are more likely to participate in collective religious practice during the work week, and some of the variation we see between men and women is in fact due to differential employment statuses.

(9.) We discretize self-reported age into ranges 18–30, 30–50, and 50+.

(10.) We define an additive index of self-reported news consumption frequencies from television, radio, newspapers or magazines, the Internet, or friends and family.

(11.) The first principal component extracted from BPCA measure on questions about gender stereotypes and women's rights.

(12.) A binary variable indicating participation in humanitarian or professional organizations, unions, sports associations, tribal groups, cooperatives, or any other civil society groups.

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